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Abstract 
Aspirations of the Middle Class:  
Voting on Redistribution and Status Concerns 
Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath* 
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the 
median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real 
human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real 
co-players has a negative effect on the median voter’s tax rate choice. Further, perceived 
income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the 
importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter 
who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not 
play a role in the political economy context. 
Keywords: Redistribution, other-regarding preferences, median voter, experiments 
JEL classification: C91, D03, D72, D78, H20 
                                                 
*   We thank participants of the research seminar on Political Economy of Reforms in Mannheim for 
valuable comments and suggestions and Nina Bonge for research assistance (z-tree 
programming). 1 Introduction
Individuals care about the distribution of income and its redistribution. They
may care because they have genuine other-regarding preferences. Alterna-
tively, a desire for (re-)distribution may be purely instrumental and caused by
motivations that are genuinely fully sel￿sh. This paper provides experimen-
tal evidence for genuinely sel￿sh motives for redistribution and own income
mobility to be the more important drivers for redistributional preferences.
Genuine other-regarding preferences may be based on several consider-
ations. Individuals could dislike highly asymmetric outcomes because they
￿nd them unfair and feel better if the distribution is more even. Likewise,
individuals may feel sorry for the ones having less and su⁄er from others hav-
ing more than themselves.1 Alternatively, individuals may genuinely like it
if others gain -whether or not these others are rich or poor- because they feel
altruism or compassion. Or they may dislike this, because they are spiteful
or envious, or because they have a genuine concern for status and a desire
for high own relative standing. Such feelings may have developed through
an indirect evolutionary approach by which types and mutations of types are
described by their preferences.2 Adam Smith (1759) described such prefer-
ences and claimed their existence in the very ￿rst paragraph of The Theory
of Moral Sentiments:
How sel￿sh soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of
1This assumption underlies an important and most in￿ uential line of research that
started with Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who show that
a large set of experimental results is consistent with optimizing behavior if individuals
maximize payo⁄ functions that are characterized by inequity aversion.
2For some examples of other-regarding preferences that can be founded by an evolu-
tionary approach, see G￿th and Yaari (1992), Bester and G￿th (1998), Huck and Oechssler
(1999), Konrad (2004).
2this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the
misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive
it in a very lively manner.
Rather di⁄erently, redistributional preferences may follow purely instrumen-
tal motives. For instance, individuals may prefer stable institutions and
may ￿nd the commitment of a society for some amount of redistribution
desirable, because their own income position may be subject to negative or
positive shocks, and they enjoy the insurance aspect of governmental redis-
tribution.3 This insurance motive may then be larger or smaller, depending
on the individual￿ s perceptions about the likelihood of own upward (down-
ward) mobility.4 Moreover, individuals may care about their income position
relative to others, because relatively high income is a signal of future high
income, or because it grants access to absolutely scarce goods and opportu-
nities, including improved prospects in the marriage market.5
Which of these reasons applies or is the more important cause of distrib-
utional preferences is relevant both for a theory of economic behavior and for
welfare considerations. It is not easy to discriminate between these theories
empirically. In the experimental laboratory, however, we can discriminate
between some classes of these theories. In particular, we can test whether
or not a preference for more redistribution is driven by the existence of a
given reference group; hence, whether individuals genuinely care about the
co-players with whom they interact, and whether they prefer the payo⁄s of
their co-players to be closer to their own payo⁄. For this purpose we consider
individuals in several treatments that are variants of the well-known Meltzer-
Richard (1981) framework, which is the benchmark model for describing the
political economy process of redistribution. In this framework individuals
3This insurance motive has been analyzed formally by Varian (1980).
4This motivation is considered by BØnabou and Ok (2001).
5This latter consideration is prominent in Hirsch (1976), but also in formal theories
of relative standing comparisons such as those posited by Frank (1984, 1985), Cole et al.
(1992), Glazer and Konrad (1996), and Corneo (2000).
3know the general distribution of abilities and their own ability. They then
choose their preferred proportional income tax. The median voter preference
is implemented, and individuals choose their labor e⁄ort, followed by taxa-
tion of gross incomes and lump-sum per-capita redistribution. We consider
several variants of this framework, where the co-players are real subjects in
some treatments and where there are no human co-players in some other
treatments.
More speci￿cally, we consider a 2 x 2 design. The treatments di⁄er along
two dimensions. One dimension introduces or removes a human reference
group: in two of the treatments the individuals interact with players that are
simulated by computers, and each individual knows that any redistribution
is between himself/herself and the computer. In two other treatments the
individuals choose their favorite amount of income redistribution, knowing
that their co-players are real human beings and anticipating the resulting
distribution of incomes after redistribution. Genuine preferences for equity
should materialize in the treatments with real co-players, but not in the
treatments with computer-simulated co-players. For the player who has the
median position in the society, this suggests more redistribution if the player
interacts with real players than if the player interacts with a computer.
The second dimension distinguishes between two types of income mobility
across a series of independent but identical games. In one type of games,
the individual keeps his/her gross wage and position in the income hierarchy
throughout all games. In the second type of games, the individual is assigned
di⁄erent positions in the income distribution throughout the rounds. Such
income mobility throughout the (independent) rounds of the experiment may
a⁄ect the individuals￿perception of e¢ ciency and tax distortion as well as
their comparison to the reference group. By a random-matching design we
eliminate possible (quasi) repeated game e⁄ects in all treatments.
We ￿nd that, in the absence of own income mobility and when removing
the reference group, players maximize their own material payo⁄. They be-
4have closely in line with the theoretical predictions of the Meltzer-Richard
(1981) framework. Interaction with real players yields a (weakly signi￿cant)
deviation from the Meltzer-Richard predictions, but this deviation is in the
opposite direction of what would be predicted by a theory of inequity aver-
sion: individuals choose less redistribution in the presence of a reference
group than when they interact with computers. Compared to the prediction
from maximizing material payo⁄, median voters adjust the income distrib-
ution in favor of the rich, at the expense of both the poor and themselves.
One possible explanation is that the presence of real co-players makes median
voters care more about overall e¢ ciency and total payo⁄s. Also, if individ-
uals have status concerns, median voters may try to distinguish themselves
more clearly from the poor, rather than trying to be closer to the rich. By
choosing lower tax rates, the median voter can keep a larger distance to the
group of low-productivity individuals.6
We also ￿nd that income mobility across formally independent rounds has
a signi￿cant impact on median tax rates. It makes individuals choose lower
redistributive taxes than with ￿xed productivities, and this e⁄ect is large and
statistically signi￿cant when players interact with computers. A reason for
this result might be that the individuals develop a stronger sense for e¢ ciency
when experiencing di⁄erent roles during the experiment. The redistribution-
decreasing e⁄ect of own income mobility across rounds is smaller and in-
signi￿cant when players interact with real players. Moreover, the e⁄ect from
introducing real co-players is not signi￿cant in the treatments with income
mobility.
If individuals choose lower tax rates than predicted because they care
about overall e¢ ciency, such considerations should be more pronounced in
the treatment with ￿ uctuating productivities where income positions are
changing during the experiment. The size of the e⁄ect of a reference group,
6This explanation based on relative standing comparisons is very much in line with the
theory predictions in Corneo and Gr￿ner (2000).
5however, is smaller (although not signi￿cantly di⁄erent) in the treatment
with ￿ uctuating productivities than in the treatment with ￿xed productiv-
ities. This suggests that status concerns vis-￿-vis the poor are the more
consistent explanation for the observed choices on redistribution. Such sta-
tus concerns could also explain why the e⁄ect of the reference group becomes
insigni￿cant when income positions are changing during the experiment and
hence, on average, di⁄erences across individuals are equalized.
The work by Meltzer and Richard (1981) has stimulated a large empir-
ical literature focusing on the relation between income and preferences for
redistribution; these studies, however, have led to mixed results.7 In the
experimental laboratory, the many additional aspects that determine pref-
erences for redistribution and interact with the benchmark e⁄ects can be
removed or controlled for. The theory of inequity aversion developed by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has generated
considerable debate and has played a dominant role in many areas of eco-
nomics more recently. Whether or not inequity aversion is at work in the
context of political decision-making on income distribution is, hence, a ques-
tion of major importance.8 While we are not aware of any experiment that
analyzes other-regarding preferences in a framework that incorporates the
Meltzer-Richard theory, existing experimental evidence mainly supports the
importance of social preferences for choices of redistribution, but also the im-
7Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) ￿nd that Swiss citizens￿demand for redistribution in-
creases with income and higher self-positioning, which they interpret as being in contra-
diction with the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. Corneo and Gr￿ner (2002) ￿nd a negative
impact of higher income for individuals￿desire for more income redistribution, but they
also show that social rivalry and social norms are relevant determinants. Krusell and R￿os-
Rull (1999) argue that their calibration model of a dynamic Meltzer-Richard framework
predicts transfers that are "quite close" to empirical data. Moene and Wallerstein (2001)
show that deviations from the Meltzer-Richard prediction on the impact of inequality can
be explained by distinguishing among di⁄erent categories of welfare spending. Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000) ￿nd evidence for a strong relationship between own earnings prospects
and attitudes towards redistribution for Russia.
8Excellent surveys of the theories of other-regarding preferences and experimental re-
sults are, for instance, Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and Cooper and Kagel (2009).
6pact of e¢ ciency considerations. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) analyze a case
where subjects endowed with di⁄erent income levels vote on a ￿xed amount
of redistribution. They ￿nd that Fehr-Schmidt-type inequity aversion may
explain their experimental results on voting on redistribution. Engelmann
and Strobel (2004) challenge the role of inequity aversion, asking whether ef-
￿ciency considerations and maximin preferences could be a more compelling
explanation for experimental ￿ndings. In their experiment, subjects choose
between di⁄erent income allocations. By varying total and relative payo⁄s,
Engelmann and Strobel explain the observed choices as being driven by self-
ishness together with e¢ ciency concerns and maximin preferences, rather
than inequality aversion. Durante and Putterman (2009) focus on the role of
self-interest, risk aversion, and fairness considerations in a framework with re-
distributional taxes; their results mainly provide support for the importance
of self-interest. Krawczyk (2010) analyzes preferences for redistribution of
randomly generated income and distinguishes whether the probabilities of
winning a high income are randomly assigned or result from individual ef-
fort/ability. Similarly, Esarey, Salmon and Barrilleaux (2010) use a labo-
ratory experiment to measure the role of left-wing or right-wing ideology
for redistributive preferences. In our analysis, we consider preferences for
redistribution in an institutional framework where individuals choose both
income-generating e⁄ort and a redistributive tax rate, and where taxation
involves incentive costs. By establishing a benchmark for redistributional
choices in the absence of a reference group, we ￿nd deviations from material
payo⁄ maximization, but the evidence suggests that these deviations must
be attributed to theories other than genuine other-regarding preferences.
In the next section, we describe the theoretical political economy frame-
work, the experimental set-up, and the theory predictions. The main exper-
imental results are in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
72 The formal setup
2.1 A Meltzer-Richard framework
Our experiment is based on the framework by Meltzer and Richard (1981)
(MR). We consider an economy that consists of three individuals. Individual
i 2 f1;2;3g has a commonly known productivity (wage) wi where w1 < w2 <
w3 and is a player in a two-stage game.
In Stage 1, each individual i states a proportional tax rate ￿i 2 [0;1]
which he/she would like to implement in the economy. The mechanism that
determines the tax rate selected and implemented for the economy is a short-
cut of the median voter theory (as employed in MR): we simply assume that
the median choice of the three preferred tax rates is selected and imple-
mented.
In Stage 2, each individual i knows the implemented tax rate ￿ and
chooses a work e⁄ort xi 2 R+. The individual wage is equal to the output
it generates. Given the tax rate ￿ and all three individuals￿e⁄ort choices,
individual payo⁄ equals










This payo⁄ consists of the following components. The own e⁄ort choice
together with the individual productivity determines an individual￿ s gross
income as wixi. This gross income is taxed at the tax rate ￿. Moreover,
there is a disutility from work e⁄ort which is assumed to be equal to x2
i=2.
Finally, the tax revenue is used solely for lump-sum redistribution. If there
are n individuals, each individual obtains the same share 1=(n ￿ 1) of the
tax payments of the other (n ￿ 1) individuals in the economy, where here
n = 3. This constitutes the last term in (1). Hence, as in the case with
in￿nitely many individuals, individuals correctly anticipate that their own
tax payment has a zero impact on the redistributive transfer they obtain.
8To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we ￿rst determine the op-
timal e⁄ort choice given the tax rate ￿. Di⁄erentiating (1) with respect to
xi yields an optimal e⁄ort choice which is equal to
x
￿
i = (1 ￿ ￿)wi: (2)
Hence, individual i￿ s e⁄ort is equal to the own net wage rate. Note that it is
independent of the choices and productivities of the other individuals.
Inserting this e⁄ort choice for individuals 1;2;3 into individual i￿ s payo⁄
















If each voter chooses the tax rate that maximizes his own payo⁄, given that
this tax rate is implemented and given that this induces all other individuals
to choose their payo⁄ maximizing work e⁄ort, the ￿rst-order condition with














Examining the second-order condition shows that the individual with the
highest wage w3 prefers a tax rate of zero,
￿ (w3) = 0: (5)
Individual 1 with the lowest productivity prefers a strictly positive tax rate
which is given in (4). The optimal tax rate choice of individual 2 with the




















9The median voter prefers a strictly positive tax rate whenever w2 is su¢ -
ciently small such that he bene￿ts from redistribution.
2.2 Experimental design and hypotheses
Design The experiment maps a Meltzer-Richard framework in which a
trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity exists. The general research question
is how individuals vote on redistribution if redistributive taxation is distortive
and individuals vote on a tax rate as well as generate income to which the
tax rate is applied. More speci￿cally, we consider four treatments which
are designed to answer two sets of questions. First, how do individuals vote
on redistribution between themselves and real players in a reference group,
compared to a situation in which there is no reference group? An answer to
this question yields insights about whether other-regarding preferences are
genuine, or derived by genuinely sel￿sh motives. Second, how do tax rate
choices within one round change when the individual productivity can change
between (independent) rounds? How do such ￿ uctuations of productivity
in￿ uence the median voters￿preference for redistribution?
In order to isolate the additional e⁄ects of other-regarding preferences
and of varying productivities, we use a 2 ￿ 2 between-subjects design. Our
￿rst question is on the impact of other-regarding preferences on the indi-
viduals￿preferred tax rates. Here, we contrast a setup where participants
are grouped into economies consisting of three ￿ real individuals￿(real co-
players) with a treatment where a participant￿ s co-players were simulated
by computers (simulated co-players). In the treatments with real co-players,
the participants were told that, in each round, they would be grouped into
economies of three participants, one with a low productivity, one with a
medium productivity, and one with a high productivity. The same applied
to the treatments with simulated co-players, but here, the participants were
informed that only one player per group would be a ￿ real participant￿and
that the other two individuals in this economy would be replaced by com-





















Table 1: Overview of the experimental design
puters - hence, their co-players would be computers. It was stated in the
instructions that the computer would choose tax rates and work e⁄ort so as
to achieve the highest payo⁄ for the respective simulated player. All other
aspects of the experiment remained exactly the same in the treatments with
real and with simulated co-players.
Changes of productivities throughout the rounds of the experiment can
have important e⁄ects on preferred tax rates, as we will discuss in greater
detail when we state our main hypotheses. Changing the participants￿roles
(individual with low, medium, or high productivity) during the experiment
could a⁄ect their perception of tax distortion e⁄ects, could lead to stronger
empathy with the other individuals, and may change the notion of a ￿ fair￿
tax rate. We distinguish two setups. In the treatments with ￿xed produc-
tivity, the participants kept their role/productivity throughout all rounds of
the experiment. They were told that, at the beginning of the experiment,
their productivity would be randomly assigned and that they would keep this
productivity in all rounds of the experiment. In contrast, in the treatments
with ￿uctuating productivity, the participants were informed that their pro-
ductivity would be newly assigned in each round with equal probability of
obtaining one of the productivities. Each single round, however, was com-
11pletely identical to the treatments with ￿xed productivity, since the current
productivity was announced at the beginning of each round. Table 1 summa-
rizes the four treatments: "FixedSim" and "FixedReal" on the one hand,
and "FluctSim" and "FluctReal" on the other hand.
In each of the four treatments, the two-stage game described in the pre-
vious section was played 12 times. The participants of the experiments were
students from di⁄erent ￿elds of study.9 In each session, after the instructions
had been read, the participants had to answer questions regarding their un-
derstanding of the experiment. By answering these questions, the partici-
pants earned their endowment in the experiment. After the 12 rounds, the
participants had to ￿ll in a questionnaire with statistical information. Fi-
nally, the participants were paid in private. One session lasted about 75
minutes, and, on average, a participant earned 14 euros, plus a show-up fee.
In each round, individuals were grouped into sets of three players. In
the treatments where co-players were simulated, this was revealed to the
participants. The productivities used in all treatments were equal to
w1 = 0, w2 = 3, and w3 = 6.
Thus, in each group consisting of three players (either three real players or
one real and two simulated players), there was one player with a productivity
of 0, one with a productivity of 3, and one with a productivity of 6. If
players choose their work e⁄ort according to the theory prediction given in
(2), payo⁄-maximizing tax rate choices are
￿ (w1) = 50%, ￿ (w2) = 33%, and ￿ (w3) = 0%; (7)
dependent on the individual productivity wi 2 f0;3;6g (compare (4)-(6)).
The sequence of actions per round was as follows. At the beginning of each
9The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007) and run at the MELESSA lab of the University of Munich. The
participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
12round, the participants were displayed their productivity and had to state the
tax rate (as an integer between 0 and 100) they would want to implement
in their economy. The computer selected the median tax rate within an
economy (consisting of 3 players), which was implemented in this economy
and round.10 The implemented tax rate was displayed on the computer
screen, and then the participants had to choose their work e⁄ort as a non-
negative real number.11 At the end of each round, participants were displayed
their own choices and their own payo⁄.
In the treatments with simulated co-players, once the tax rate was imple-
mented, the computer chose the payo⁄-maximizing work e⁄ort (as in (2)) for
the simulated players, which is independent of the other players￿decisions.
The simulated players￿preferred tax rate depends on work e⁄ort choices in
stage 2. We let the computer choose the simulated players￿preferred tax rate
as if work e⁄ort choices are in line with the theory prediction. Of course, we
do not use these choices as observations. Our analysis uses the real players￿
choices of their preferred tax rates as observations, and these are independent
of the tax rates the computer would choose for the simulated players.
In the instructions, the participants were told that, in each round of the
experiment, they would be randomly re-matched with two other participants
to form a group. In fact, in the experiment, without being precise about
that, we used matching groups of 9 participants to randomly be divided into
three ￿ economies￿to obtain a larger number of independent observations. In
the treatments with simulated co-players, a matching group consists of only
one ￿ real participant￿ .
10To be precise, only with probability 0:8 did the computer select the median tax rate;
with the remaining probability, either the lowest or the highest of the three proposed tax
rates was selected. This deviation from the median voter theory was used to incentivize
players with low or high productivity to state their preferred tax rate, and it was made
common knowledge. It does, however, not change each player￿ s optimal tax rate choice.
11There was an upper bound for this choice equal to 6, which would be the optimal
choice of the individual with the high productivity if the tax rate were zero.
13Predictions The treatments with simulated co-players constitute an
important benchmark when determining preferences for redistribution in a
framework with distortionary redistributive taxation. Here, we can exam-
ine whether subjects understand the disincentive e⁄ect of higher tax rates
for work e⁄ort and the implication for redistributive taxes. The median tax
rate in the FixedSim treatment establishes the median voter￿ s preferred tax
rate in a framework where (i) other-regarding preferences and similar con-
siderations can be excluded as potential factors that shape redistributional
preferences and (ii) the individuals￿balancing of tax distortion e⁄ects versus
redistribution is undisturbed by ￿ uctuations of individual productivity.
Using the observed choices in the FixedSim treatment as the baseline
for a comparison, we are able isolate the e⁄ect of other-regarding preferences
on the preferred amount of redistribution. We compare a) tax rate choices
in FixedSim treatment to choices in the FixedReal treatment, and b) tax
rates in FluctSim treatment to those in the FluctReal treatment. Let ^ ￿
m
denote the average of the empirically observed median tax rates (the preferred
tax rates of the individuals with median productivity). If individuals have
only self-regarding preferences, maximization of own monetary payo⁄ leads
to the ￿rst main hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 a) In the treatments with ￿xed productivity, median tax rates
are the same with real co-players as with simulated co-players:
^ ￿
m (FixedReal) = ^ ￿
m (FixedSim):
b) In the treatments with ￿uctuating productivity, median tax rates are the
same with real co-players as with simulated co-players:
^ ￿
m (FluctReal) = ^ ￿
m (FluctSim):
If other-regarding preferences a⁄ect the median voter￿ s preferred tax rate
and individuals have inequity aversion, we should observe median tax rates
14in the treatments with real co-players that are higher than in the treatments
with simulated co-players:
^ ￿
m (FixedReal) > ^ ￿
m (FixedSim)
^ ￿
m (FluctReal) > ^ ￿
m (FluctSim)
Intuitively, by choosing a higher tax rate, the median voter increases the in-
come of the poor individual in the society, and at the same time, he decreases
the distance between his income and the income of the rich individual. Hence,
the median voter￿ s preference for redistribution should be stronger when in-
dividuals care about equity.
Then, we analyze how changes in productivity a⁄ect median tax rates.
Since rounds are completely independent and there is no uncertainty about
the productivity in each single round, standard economic theory predicts that
￿ uctuations of individual productivity do not change the median tax rates
compared to the case of ￿xed productivities.
Hypothesis 2 a) In the treatments with simulated co-players, median tax
rates are the same with ￿uctuating productivity as with ￿xed productivity:
^ ￿
m (FluctSim) = ^ ￿
m (FixedSim):
b) In the treatments with real co-players, median tax rates are the same with
￿uctuating productivity as with ￿xed productivity:
^ ￿
m (FluctReal) = ^ ￿
m (FixedReal):
If ￿ uctuations of individual productivity during the experiment lead to
median tax rates that di⁄er from those observed with ￿xed productivity,
there are several possible explanations for such a change in behavior. First,
when productivity changes during the experiment, individuals may perceive
productivities as being random even in the actual round and therefore de-
15velop a stronger sense of e¢ ciency. They may take the tax distortion ef-
fect better into account and adapt their tax rate choice accordingly. This
would lead to median tax rates being lower with ￿ uctuating productivity
than with ￿xed productivity. Second, when individuals experience di⁄erent
productivity levels, in the treatments with real co-players this may increase
their empathy for the di⁄erent productivity types; the additional e⁄ect on
median tax rates, however, is ambiguous.12 Third, when individuals care
about the other individuals￿total payo⁄ in the experiment, then the e⁄ect
of other-regarding preferences should be weaker with ￿ uctuating productiv-
ities than with ￿xed productivities, because total payo⁄s are equalized in
the treatments with ￿ uctuating productivities. In the case of real co-players,
this should lead to lower median tax rates with ￿ uctuating productivity than
with ￿xed productivity.
In the treatments with simulated co-players, the second and third e⁄ects
of ￿ uctuating productivities are excluded by construction: since co-players
are simulated by computers, we do not expect empathy for other individuals
or other-regarding preferences to play any role. Thus, if median tax rates
in the FluctSim treatment di⁄er from those in the FixedSim treatment,
we would expect median tax rates to be lower in the FluctSim treatment.
Other-regarding preferences could not explain such deviations from the the-
ory prediction; a di⁄erence would have to be attributed to the fact that
individuals perceive productivities as random and changing over time and
therefore choose tax rates that are less distortive. Comparing the treatment
e⁄ects of ￿ uctuating productivities in the cases of simulated and real co-
players, we can shed light on the question of how other-regarding preferences
interact with ￿ uctuations of productivity, in addition to the change in the
perception of e¢ ciency.
12The individual history in the experiment may help to identify e⁄ects of increased
empathy for the poor versus the rich individual.
163 Results
This section discusses the main results of our study. Before turning to the
tax rate choices, we will examine how the participants adjusted their work
e⁄ort in reaction to the implemented tax rate. Finding out whether tax
distortion of work e⁄ort is in line with the theory prediction and whether
there are di⁄erences between treatments is an important building block for
the analysis of preferred tax rates.
We estimate work e⁄ort as a function of the net wage,
xikt = f ((1 ￿ ￿kt)wikt);
where wikt is the productivity/wage rate of individual i in group k and round
t and ￿kt is the tax rate valid in group k and round t. According to the theory
prediction, the slope of the function f should be equal to 1 since predicted
work e⁄ort is equal to the net wage (see (2)). To allow for di⁄erent slopes
in the di⁄erent treatments, we interact the net wage with dummy variables
Fluct, Real, and FluctReal=Fluct￿Real, included in a vector TR.
The variable Fluct (Real) is equal to one if the observation comes from a
treatment with ￿ uctuating productivity (real co-players), and zero otherwise.
In the same way, we allow for treatment-speci￿c intercepts. We estimate a
linear regression of the form
xikt = ￿0 + ￿ ￿ TR + ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿kt)wikt + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿kt)wikt ￿ TR + "it:
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.13
The most important coe¢ cient is ￿0, which estimates the marginal impact
of the net wage on e⁄ort choices; the estimated coe¢ cient is equal to 1:002
and therefore perfectly in line with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the
13In the estimation, standard errors are clustered at the level of a matching group
(groups of 9 participants in the treatments with real co-players and one participant in the
treatments with simulated co-players).
17Work e⁄ort
Estimated equation














￿0 ((1 ￿ ￿it)wit)
1.002￿￿￿
(0.021)
￿1 ((1 ￿ ￿it)wit￿Fluct)
0.017
(0.037)
￿2 ((1 ￿ ￿it)wit￿Real)
-0.021
(0.028)





Note: ￿￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the level
of matching groups).
Table 2: Estimation results for choices of work e⁄ort.
18estimated coe¢ cients ￿1 to ￿3 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.14
As a ￿rst main result, we ￿nd that individuals behave almost perfectly
in line with the theory prediction when choosing their work e⁄ort, and they
behave very similarly across treatments, in particular when we consider only
rounds where the participants have already become familiar with the frame-
work. Thus, the individuals understand the disincentive e⁄ect that higher
taxes have for choices of e⁄ort, and they choose their e⁄ort so as to maxi-
mize their monetary payo⁄. In turn, they were also able to anticipate the
tax distortion e⁄ects when stating their preferred tax rate. The fact that in-
dividuals understand the trade-o⁄between more redistribution and stronger
distortions of e⁄ort choices is an important prerequisite for the following
analysis of preferred tax rates.
Now we turn to the main part of our paper and analyze tax rate choices.
Our estimations will focus on median tax rates and test Hypotheses 1 and 2
on equality of median tax rates across treatments. To start with, we give an
overview of tax rate choices; Figure 1 plots the average preferred tax rates
in each round, separated by treatment and productivity level.
First, as it becomes obvious in Figure 1, in all treatments preferred tax
rates are lower the higher one￿ s own productivity. Hence, independent of
the nature of the co-players and productivity changes, own material inter-
est seems to be a strong driving force of tax rate choices. Second, tax rate
choices of voters with high productivity are on average 5 ￿ 6% in all treat-
ments and therefore close to the theory prediction of 0%. Tax rate choices of
low-productivity voters show more variance, both over time and across treat-
ments (treatment averages are between 57:9% and 73:4%); moreover, they
14There is a signi￿cant treatment e⁄ect if we compare the FluctReal treatment to the
FluctSim treatment. This e⁄ect is measured by comparing ￿1 (Fluct) to ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3
(Fluct+Real+FluctReal); we can reject at the 5%-level that ￿2 + ￿3 = 0. This
treatment e⁄ect becomes non-signi￿cant if we drop the observations from early rounds
(the ￿rst two rounds) and hence account for learning e⁄ects. The other treatment e⁄ects
(￿1, ￿2, ￿1 + ￿2) are non-signi￿cant. See Figure 2 for a graphical illustration of the
treatment e⁄ects in the context of median tax rates.
19Figure 1: Summary of preferred tax rates (by treatment).
are higher than the theory prediction of 50%. Both higher mean and higher
variance could be explained by the fact that those preferred tax rates had
almost never been implemented, and thus there was little chance of learning
what e⁄ect such high tax rates would have for individual payo⁄s.
Third, and most importantly, Figure 1 shows that there are di⁄erences
in median tax rates across treatments. In the FixedSim treatment, the
average median tax rate is 34:6% and hence almost exactly equal to the
theory prediction of 33%. Hence, in the absence of all possible e⁄ects that
could disturb the tax rate choices, the median voter selects tax rates that
perfectly re￿ ect the trade-o⁄ between redistribution and e¢ ciency, as pre-
dicted by MR. Taking into account other-regarding preferences or ￿ uctuating
productivities, however, distorts this choice. With ￿ uctuating productivities
(FluctSim), the average median tax rate is only 23:9% and therefore clearly
lower; the same occurs in the FixedReal treatment, where we also observe
lower median tax rates (26% on average). This is a surprising result, since
20the consideration of inequity aversion should have caused median tax rates to
be higher. Finally, median tax rates are lowest in the FluctReal treatment
(19:3% on average).
Altogether, the inclusion of real co-players leads, both with ￿xed and with
￿ uctuating productivities, to a decrease of median tax rates, although with
￿ uctuating productivities this e⁄ect is smaller. Similarly, the fact that pro-
ductivities are changing during the experiment decreases median tax rates;
here, the e⁄ect is weaker with real co-players than with simulated co-players.
Hence, even if the e⁄ect per se may be surprising, both variations in the ex-
perimental setup lead to a consistent change in median voters￿choices of tax
rates. We will discuss the implications of these results below, after estimating
the standard errors corresponding to the average median tax rates. For this
purpose, we estimate the median voter￿ s tax rate choice ￿kt in group k and
period t as a function of treatment dummies (vector TR) as well as control
variables for individual-speci￿c characteristics (vector CONTROL).15 The
estimation results are shown in Table 3.
The constant ￿0 measures the average median tax rate in the FixedSim
treatment, which is the baseline category in the estimation. In estimation (1),
￿1 and ￿2 measure the average e⁄ect of ￿ uctuating productivities (Fluct)
and of real co-players (Real), respectively. Estimations (2)-(4) include the
interaction term FluctReal=Fluct￿Real; hence, ￿1 (￿1+￿3) estimates
the average e⁄ect of ￿ uctuating productivities if co-players are simulated (real
participants), and ￿2 (￿2+￿3) estimates the average e⁄ect of other-regarding
preferences in the cases of ￿xed (￿ uctuating) productivities (compare Figure
2). In addition, estimations (3) and (4) control for individual-speci￿c charac-
teristics.16 The results basically con￿rm what the overview of preferred tax
15Again, we cluster standard errors on the level of matching groups to control for non-
independence of observations.
16The control variables use data from the exit questionnaire and include gender, age,
height, number of siblings, and ￿eld and year of study. Apart from gender, age and year
of study turn out to have small signi￿cant e⁄ects. The dummy variable "economist"
indicates students from economics, business administration, and business mathematics (in
21Median tax rate
Estimated equation
￿kt= ￿0 + ￿ ￿ TR + ￿ ￿ CONTROL + "it


















































R2 (overall) 0.052 0.054 0.116 0.142
N 765 765 762 762
Note: Tax rates in percentage. ￿￿￿(￿￿;￿) signi￿cant at 1% (5%,10%). Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the level of matching groups).
Table 3: Regression results for median tax rates.
22Figure 2: Average median tax rates (in percentage) and treatment e⁄ects.
rates has already suggested. Median tax rates in the FixedSim treatment
almost perfectly match the theory prediction, but median tax rates in all
other treatments are lower.
Hypothesis 1 Consider ￿rst the impact of real co-players, which allows
us to examine how other-regarding preferences interact with the balancing
of redistribution versus e¢ ciency. Overall, introducing a reference group
has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on median tax rate (see ￿2 in estimation
(1); the corresponding p-value is 0:058). Estimations (2)-(4) separate the
e⁄ect of real co-players across treatments with ￿xed and with ￿ uctuating
productivities. We ￿nd that there is a strong negative e⁄ect of having real
instead of simulated co-players in the treatments with ￿xed productivities
(see ￿2). Median tax rates are by about 10 percentage points lower with real
than with simulated co-players; the di⁄erence is signi￿cant as soon as we
control for individual-speci￿c characteristics. Contrary to what one might
have expected, we ￿nd support for median tax rates being lower, rather than
higher, when including the reference group.
The treatment e⁄ect of real co-players is weaker in the treatments with
total 17:8% of the participants).
23￿ uctuating productivity (measured by ￿2 + ￿3), and it is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. The change in median tax rates, however, has the same
sign: including other-regarding preferences into the picture leads, if at all,
to lower tax rate choices of the median voter. Thus, our evidence suggests
that inequity aversion does not play a role for tax rate choices; if at all,
other-regarding preferences cause an adjustment of tax rates in the oppo-
site direction than predicted.17 After testing Hypothesis 2, we will discuss
possible explanations for this ￿nding.18
Hypothesis 2 Contrary to the theory prediction, changing the produc-
tivities during the experiment leads to lower tax rates. The average impact of
￿ uctuating productivities is signi￿cant at the 5%-level (see ￿1 in estimation
(1); p-value is 0:024). Moreover, if we separate treatments with simulated
and with real co-players, we ￿nd a large and signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect of
￿ uctuating productivities in the case of simulated co-players where median
tax rates decrease by 10 percentage points (see a1 in estimations (2)-(4)).
The e⁄ect is weaker and no longer statistically signi￿cant in the case of real
co-players (compare ￿1 + ￿3 in estimations (2)-(4)).19
17Note that separating the choices of economics students from non-economics students
reveals that the e⁄ect of introducing a reference group is mainly driven by non-economics
students (compare estimation (4) in Table 3). In the treatments with simulated co-players,
choices from economics students di⁄er only by ￿0:9 from those of non-economics students;
introducing real co-players, however, leads to lower tax rate choices of non-economists (see
￿2) while choices of economists remain rather unchanged (compare a2+economist￿Real).
18Running non-parametric tests on average median tax rates per matching group con-
￿rms our ￿ndings: tax rate choices with and without real co-players do not signi￿cantly
di⁄er. In the case of ￿xed productivities we can reject that median tax rates with real
co-players are higher than with simulated co-players (FixedReal versus FixedSim); ac-
counting for learning e⁄ects and considering only observations from periods 7 ￿ 12, we
can reject at the 10%-level that median tax rates in FixedSim and FixedReal are the
same. Test statistics re￿ ect the importance of individual-speci￿c characteristics for tax
rate choices.
19Non-parametric tests on average median tax rates per matching group again support
these results: we ￿nd a signi￿cant impact of ￿ uctuating productivity if co-players are
simulated (FluctSim versus FixedSim), but we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the
case of real co-players (FluctReal versus FixedReal).
24Keeping in mind that rounds are completely independent from each other
and exactly identical in all treatments, this is a strong result. First, in the
case of simulated co-players, this e⁄ect cannot be attributed to a di⁄erent
perception of co-players in the sense that, for instance, individuals develop
increased empathy with other individuals because of productivity ￿ uctua-
tions. An explanation remains that the variability of productivities makes
individuals perceive their own productivity as being random, even if, in each
particular round, the productivity is ￿xed. Such a perceived randomness
should lead to lower preferred tax rates because e¢ ciency concerns become
more pronounced.
Taking together the results from all four treatments, we will now discuss
whether redistributive choices are in line with some widely applied expla-
nations for preferences for redistribution. In particular, we will focus on
four categories of other-regarding preferences: inequity aversion, reciprocity,
maximization of group payo⁄s, and status concerns.
Inequity aversion. If median voters￿preferences express inequity aversion,
this should lead to an upward adjustment of median tax rates in order to
achieve more redistribution compared to the own payo⁄-maximizing choice.
An increase in redistribution reduces both the distance to the poor and to
the rich individual, which increases the utility of inequity-averse individuals.
Our estimation results, however, show that such an adjustment of median
tax rates can be rejected: in all estimations, we can reject that median tax
rates are higher with real than with simulated co-players when productivities
are ￿xed, and we do not ￿nd a di⁄erence when productivities ￿ uctuate.
Looking only at the treatments with real participants, one might think
that individuals do express some degree of inequity aversion since there is
less redistribution, although insigni￿cantly, when productivities ￿ uctuate and
payo⁄di⁄erences are equalized throughout the experiment. In the same way,
however, ￿ uctuating productivities lead to lower median tax rates in the
treatments with simulated co-players, where the e⁄ect cannot be attributed
25to other-regarding preferences, but rather to a di⁄erent perception of mobil-
ity. On the contrary, the fact that ￿3 is positive means that including both
￿ uctuating productivities and other-regarding preferences has weakened one
or the other e⁄ect, or both (the joint e⁄ect of Fluct and Real is smaller
than the sum of the isolated e⁄ects; see also Figure 2). Hence, taking into
account the strong e⁄ect of ￿ uctuating productivities in the treatments with
simulated co-players does not leave room for interpreting the weak di⁄erence
between FixedReal and FluctReal as inequity aversion.
Reciprocity. Alternatively, the fact that median tax rates are lower in
the presence of real co-players could hint at reciprocal behavior: by choos-
ing lower tax rates the median voter might try to induce higher work e⁄ort
choices by high-productivity individuals and in this way increase his own
monetary payo⁄. To analyze more closely this hypothesis, we run the re-
gression on work e⁄ort only for the individuals with the high productivity
and estimate the tax elasticity in "some interior interval". In the estimations
shown in Table 4, we estimate work e⁄ort choices as in Table 2 above, re-
stricting observations to high-productivity individuals and implemented tax
rates being between 10 and 50.20
Considerations of reciprocity should lead to a stronger tax elasticity of
e⁄ort choices in the treatments with real participants, i.e., a larger estimated
coe¢ cient ￿. As the estimation results show, however, we do not ￿nd ev-
idence for reciprocal behavior in the sense of a larger ￿ in the estimations
with real co-players. In contrast, the tax elasticity in the treatments with
real participants does not di⁄er from the elasticity in the treatments with
simulated participants (compare coe¢ cients ￿2 and ￿2 + ￿3). This is in line
with the estimation in Table 2 where we did not ￿nd treatment di⁄erences
with respect to work e⁄ort choices.
20The results do not change if we vary the boundaries of the "interior interval" for the
tax elasticity. The estimations, however, become more variable if we include implemented
tax rates up to 100%; those observations stem almost entirely from the treatments with
real participants, where the variance of implemented tax rates is higher.
26Work e⁄ort of high-productivity individuals
Estimated equation



































￿3 ((1 ￿ ￿it)wit￿Fluct￿Real)
0.123
(0.346)
R2 (overall) 0.347 0.348
N 538 538
Note: ￿￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%. Observations included if wage rate equals 6 and tax
rate between 10 and 50. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the level of
matching groups).
Table 4: Tax elasticity of e⁄ort choices of high-productivity subjects.
27Maximization of group payo⁄s. If median voters care about total payo⁄s
within their society, this would explain why we observe lower tax rates when-
ever there are real co-players. (In addition, we would expect e⁄ort choices
to be higher; the estimation results in Table 2, however, con￿rm that ef-
fort choices maximize own monetary payo⁄.) Concerns about group payo⁄s
should be more pronounced in the treatments with ￿ uctuating productivi-
ties, where individuals experience di⁄erent roles throughout the experiment.
Here, the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄shifts in favor of e¢ ciency considerations
because equity is restored through income mobility. While median tax rates
are indeed lowest in the FluctReal treatment, the impact of real co-players
is much weaker in the treatments with ￿ uctuating productivities compared
to those with ￿xed productivities, and it is statistically insigni￿cant. Expe-
riencing di⁄erent roles already reduces the tax rate choices of median voters
in the treatments with simulated co-players, where it cannot be interpreted
as an attempt to maximize group payo⁄s. Hence, even if group payo⁄s may
play a role for individual choices, we do not ￿nd consistent evidence for such
behavior.
Status considerations. A ￿nal explanation remains that median tax rates
express status concerns: the choices of tax rates might be driven by income
comparisons with the poor and the rich individual. While the monetary pay-
o⁄of the rich is considerably higher than the median voter￿ s payo⁄(unless the
tax rate approaches 100%), redistribution blurs the di⁄erence between the
poor and the "middle class"; by choosing lower tax rates, the median voter
can keep distance to the group of poor individuals. Since ￿ uctuating pro-
ductivities equalize di⁄erences across individuals throughout the experiment,
such status concerns should be much more pronounced in the treatments with
￿xed productivities. Indeed, in the treatments with ￿xed productivities we
observe a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect of introducing a reference group, while
in the treatments with ￿ uctuating productivities this e⁄ect becomes weaker
and is no longer signi￿cant.
28Summarizing, we interpret our ￿nding on the role of other-regarding pref-
erences as positional concerns of the median voters when they vote on redis-
tribution.
Our experiment also reveals interesting ￿ndings with respect to gender
di⁄erences.21 A considerable amount of empirical evidence suggests that
male beings are more willing to assume risks (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer
1999), and evolutionary biologists and economists have argued that greater
sexual selection pressures for men may have shaped their higher risk-taking
as a useful strategy in "winner-take-all" situations.22 Applying these con-
siderations to the context of income distribution, male subjects may care
more about their income position relative to the top earners and may be
willing to sacri￿ce income in absolute terms if this brings them closer to the
top income position, whereas females may care more for high absolute in-
come. Translated to the tax rate choices, males with median income should
choose higher tax rates than females: if median voters choose more redistrib-
ution, this implies that the income distance to the rich individual is reduced,
accepting that also the distance to the poor decreases. In turn, median tax
rates should be lower whenever the individuals￿status concerns are expressed
vis-￿-vis the poor rather than relative to the top earners. Using statistical
information about the participants of our experiment, we ￿nd that, on aver-
age, tax rates preferred by males with median productivity are 10% higher
than those chosen by female median voters (compare "male" in estimations
(2)-(4) in Table 3).23 This di⁄erence is in line with the idea that tax rate
choices are a⁄ected by status concerns and relative standing comparisons,
rather than by group payo⁄ or inequity considerations.
21See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey of gender di⁄erences in experiments in
economics.
22Risk-taking, or the choice of the higher variance outcome, in turn, is a viable strategy
in some types of competition for high rank or status (Dekel and Scotchmer, 1999).
23Note that male + male￿Real is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (p-value is 0:018);
hence, looking only at treatments with real participants, this con￿rms our result of more
redistribution being chosen by male participants.
294 Conclusion
In this paper we consider median voters￿decisions on income redistribution in
a formal framework that has been introduced by Meltzer and Richard (1981)
and that has become the benchmark model for the study of the political econ-
omy of redistributive taxes. Our main research question is on the distinction
between instrumental, but genuinely sel￿sh motives for income redistribution,
and genuine other-regarding preferences. We focus on the median voter, who
represents a member of the middle class. We ask: is this representative of the
middle class mainly guided by motives that are genuinely sel￿sh, and is re-
distribution therefore mainly instrumental for achieving what can ultimately
be identi￿ed as sel￿sh goals? Or do voters have genuine other-regarding
preferences? The main tool for distinguishing between these two sets of dis-
tributional concerns is to eliminate human co-players from the picture in one
half of the treatments, and to replace them by computerized automated co-
players. We ￿nd that the desired amount of redistribution for the middle
class is highest if the individual income position is stable over time, whereas
the desired amount of redistribution decreases in a less stable environment.
Second, voters choose less redistribution -thereby implementing a less egali-
tarian society- if their co-players are real human players. This result strongly
indicates that inequity aversion, if it exists at all in political economy con-
texts, must be superseded by other types of other-regarding preferences that
dominate for the overall e⁄ect. The type of other-regarding preferences that
is mapped well by the data is an aspiration of the middle class to be di⁄erent
and more clearly distinguishable from the poor.
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